Omer Bartov's "Israel: What Went Wrong?" is concerned with far more than the genocide question. It also asks whether its current condition was inevitable, and whether something can be done about it
Thank you, Harry. That indeed was one of the few things that I was expecting to learn about in the book, and I was surprised (and disappointed) that he largely left the subject alone.
Excellent summary of Bartov's book. What is missing from his book (although to my mind implied in the title) is a discussion of how the idealistic, socialist, pioneering nation of 1948 could, within the space of two generations, move so far to the right as to elect a government containing neo-fascist extremists. It is a psychological question, not a political one. I imagine the short answer is that many Israelis have been so traumatised by 80 years of conflict that they have lost sight of fundamental Jewish humanitarian values. That and a sense of exceptionalism on the religious right. There is a call for an analysis like this, if only to answer some of the questions that are dogging so many of us in the diaspora.
I have two big disagreements with Bartov (and pro-Palestinians in general):
1) It is wrong to place the whole blame on Israel. The Palestinians have rejected three peace plans that gave them back all the occupied territories (in 2001, 2008 and 2014).
2) Zionism was not a choice, it was a necessity, as Jews had nowhere to go. While Bartov acknowledges that Zionism saved his family, he still argues that Jewish statehood was wrong, and that the Zionist movement should have pursued a binational solution instead.
This claim is totally misleading. Until 1936, the Zionist leadership called for the establishment of a "parity state" in which Jews and Arabs would share power 50-50. However, the handful of Palestinian Arabs who were willing to contemplate a federal solution insisted on the need to halt Jewish immigration, as they feared that once Jews would outnumber the Arabs, they might be tempted to repeal the parity agreement and takeover the country by force.
So Bartov has to be clear: if he believes that only a limited number of Jews should have found refuge in Palestine, he should say so openly. The onus is on him to explain what should have been done to rescue the other Jews who had nowhere else to go (and let’s not forget that it was impossible to predict the decline of antisemitism in the following decades).
Was really hoping to gain more of your perspective to provide the complexity I know you see in these matters. In general, intellectuals who self-alienate from their people only to write how wrong they are remind me of men and women who go on long diatribes about how their Ex is so deeply troubled that they can't understand why anyone would marry them. They might not be wrong, but their argument comes from a dishonest and interested place.
Ariel, if my perspective wasn't clear in the review, I would say that I basically accept and agree with Bartov's analysis, and I had the sense that it was as painful for him to write it as it was for me to read it. (I know that sounds like saying, "this is going to hurt me more than it hurts you...") And as opposed to Peter Beinart, for example, I don't see evidence that Bartov has "self-alienated" himself from his people, or is disavowing Israel. He doesn't approve of what Israel has become, but he is offering his analysis and even advice as an interested party. , who cares very much about the state, even if he doesn't live here.
Does he account for the massive surge in civil society engagement with liberal, democratic activism? With the rise of movements such as the Mercazim or Standing Together or the mainstreaming of protective presence? Because those signals seem to be lost or not present in what I've read from him so far.
Very lucid article. Bartov points out that Israel lifted martial law from Israeli Arabs in 1966, which is evidence, IMO, that what guaranteed Israel's descent into ultranationalism, militarism and racism wasn't independence in 1948 but occupation in 1967. More evidence: Until 67, Israel had great relations with newly independent states in Africa and Asia, it ran an institute in agriculture and I think other skills that attracted thousands of Third World students. In Israel's early years, South Africa didn't like its Jews and didn't like Israel -- until the occupation changed that, and the apartheid regime recognized a newly kindred spirit. Things could have been very different if Israel had "gone home" right after the Six Day War. Now it's possible (though not certain) that it's too late.
I think there is a lot to debate about Bartov’s interpretation that an alternative path was viable after the war ended in 1948, but I’ll leave that to the historians. I believe Avi Shlaim and others have gently pushed back when asked for their opinions. The only point I want to make is that there really was no chance that Israel would go home after the Six Day War. I note that you used scare quotes so you may be suggesting that yourself. To confirm my recollection I just pulled up the following via an AI prompt:
Timeline of Discussions and LegislationJune 11, 1967: Only one day after the war ended, the Israeli Cabinet held its first formal discussion and backed the idea of annexing East Jerusalem.June 14–15, 1967: The Ministerial Committee on Security held intensive debates. Members failed to reach a consensus on the broader territories but agreed on the unique status of Jerusalem.June 18–19, 1967: The full government forum discussed peace plans and the fate of captured territories, solidifying the intent to bring East Jerusalem under Israeli law.June 27, 1967: The formal legislative process commenced in the Knesset. Members debated and passed Amendment No. 11 to the Law and Administration Ordinance, which granted the government authority to apply Israeli law to any part of "Eretz Israel".
The East Jerusalem annexation was essentially an immediate act and Israel was never going to go home from there. I have a story from a close family member who was in college at the time. She was speaking with her father a couple days after the war. He had immigrated to the US from Palestine in 1930. She expressed excitement over the prospect for peace being achieved through trading the captured territory. He scoffed at that notion, telling her excitedly that the area below the Western Wall, which had been crowded with the shops and stalls of merchants, had already been cleared out to prepare the area for access as a prayer site. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with Bartov’s views about 1948, it is hard not to see June 1967 as the point when the door of opportunity began to slam shut.
I should have included the following part of the AI response which shows the intentionality and planning involved:
Key Legislative StrategyTo minimize international backlash, the government used a specific legal strategy during the Knesset sessions:Neutral Language: The amendment intentionally avoided using the words "annexation" or "Jerusalem".Administrative Framing: It was presented as a measure to provide "standard services" (like water and electricity) and administrative order to the area.Governmental Order: The law gave the Cabinet the power to issue an order to expand jurisdiction, which they did the very next day, on June 28, 1967.💡 Legislative Speed: The Knesset passed the amendment through all three required readings in a single marathon session on June 27 to ensure the new legal status was established before further international diplomatic pressure could mount.
Thank you, Harry. That indeed was one of the few things that I was expecting to learn about in the book, and I was surprised (and disappointed) that he largely left the subject alone.
Excellent summary of Bartov's book. What is missing from his book (although to my mind implied in the title) is a discussion of how the idealistic, socialist, pioneering nation of 1948 could, within the space of two generations, move so far to the right as to elect a government containing neo-fascist extremists. It is a psychological question, not a political one. I imagine the short answer is that many Israelis have been so traumatised by 80 years of conflict that they have lost sight of fundamental Jewish humanitarian values. That and a sense of exceptionalism on the religious right. There is a call for an analysis like this, if only to answer some of the questions that are dogging so many of us in the diaspora.
I have two big disagreements with Bartov (and pro-Palestinians in general):
1) It is wrong to place the whole blame on Israel. The Palestinians have rejected three peace plans that gave them back all the occupied territories (in 2001, 2008 and 2014).
2) Zionism was not a choice, it was a necessity, as Jews had nowhere to go. While Bartov acknowledges that Zionism saved his family, he still argues that Jewish statehood was wrong, and that the Zionist movement should have pursued a binational solution instead.
This claim is totally misleading. Until 1936, the Zionist leadership called for the establishment of a "parity state" in which Jews and Arabs would share power 50-50. However, the handful of Palestinian Arabs who were willing to contemplate a federal solution insisted on the need to halt Jewish immigration, as they feared that once Jews would outnumber the Arabs, they might be tempted to repeal the parity agreement and takeover the country by force.
So Bartov has to be clear: if he believes that only a limited number of Jews should have found refuge in Palestine, he should say so openly. The onus is on him to explain what should have been done to rescue the other Jews who had nowhere else to go (and let’s not forget that it was impossible to predict the decline of antisemitism in the following decades).
Was really hoping to gain more of your perspective to provide the complexity I know you see in these matters. In general, intellectuals who self-alienate from their people only to write how wrong they are remind me of men and women who go on long diatribes about how their Ex is so deeply troubled that they can't understand why anyone would marry them. They might not be wrong, but their argument comes from a dishonest and interested place.
Ariel, if my perspective wasn't clear in the review, I would say that I basically accept and agree with Bartov's analysis, and I had the sense that it was as painful for him to write it as it was for me to read it. (I know that sounds like saying, "this is going to hurt me more than it hurts you...") And as opposed to Peter Beinart, for example, I don't see evidence that Bartov has "self-alienated" himself from his people, or is disavowing Israel. He doesn't approve of what Israel has become, but he is offering his analysis and even advice as an interested party. , who cares very much about the state, even if he doesn't live here.
Does he account for the massive surge in civil society engagement with liberal, democratic activism? With the rise of movements such as the Mercazim or Standing Together or the mainstreaming of protective presence? Because those signals seem to be lost or not present in what I've read from him so far.
Very lucid article. Bartov points out that Israel lifted martial law from Israeli Arabs in 1966, which is evidence, IMO, that what guaranteed Israel's descent into ultranationalism, militarism and racism wasn't independence in 1948 but occupation in 1967. More evidence: Until 67, Israel had great relations with newly independent states in Africa and Asia, it ran an institute in agriculture and I think other skills that attracted thousands of Third World students. In Israel's early years, South Africa didn't like its Jews and didn't like Israel -- until the occupation changed that, and the apartheid regime recognized a newly kindred spirit. Things could have been very different if Israel had "gone home" right after the Six Day War. Now it's possible (though not certain) that it's too late.
I think there is a lot to debate about Bartov’s interpretation that an alternative path was viable after the war ended in 1948, but I’ll leave that to the historians. I believe Avi Shlaim and others have gently pushed back when asked for their opinions. The only point I want to make is that there really was no chance that Israel would go home after the Six Day War. I note that you used scare quotes so you may be suggesting that yourself. To confirm my recollection I just pulled up the following via an AI prompt:
Timeline of Discussions and LegislationJune 11, 1967: Only one day after the war ended, the Israeli Cabinet held its first formal discussion and backed the idea of annexing East Jerusalem.June 14–15, 1967: The Ministerial Committee on Security held intensive debates. Members failed to reach a consensus on the broader territories but agreed on the unique status of Jerusalem.June 18–19, 1967: The full government forum discussed peace plans and the fate of captured territories, solidifying the intent to bring East Jerusalem under Israeli law.June 27, 1967: The formal legislative process commenced in the Knesset. Members debated and passed Amendment No. 11 to the Law and Administration Ordinance, which granted the government authority to apply Israeli law to any part of "Eretz Israel".
The East Jerusalem annexation was essentially an immediate act and Israel was never going to go home from there. I have a story from a close family member who was in college at the time. She was speaking with her father a couple days after the war. He had immigrated to the US from Palestine in 1930. She expressed excitement over the prospect for peace being achieved through trading the captured territory. He scoffed at that notion, telling her excitedly that the area below the Western Wall, which had been crowded with the shops and stalls of merchants, had already been cleared out to prepare the area for access as a prayer site. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with Bartov’s views about 1948, it is hard not to see June 1967 as the point when the door of opportunity began to slam shut.
I should have included the following part of the AI response which shows the intentionality and planning involved:
Key Legislative StrategyTo minimize international backlash, the government used a specific legal strategy during the Knesset sessions:Neutral Language: The amendment intentionally avoided using the words "annexation" or "Jerusalem".Administrative Framing: It was presented as a measure to provide "standard services" (like water and electricity) and administrative order to the area.Governmental Order: The law gave the Cabinet the power to issue an order to expand jurisdiction, which they did the very next day, on June 28, 1967.💡 Legislative Speed: The Knesset passed the amendment through all three required readings in a single marathon session on June 27 to ensure the new legal status was established before further international diplomatic pressure could mount.